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Romalpa thirty years on – still an enigma?  
 
 





A reservation of title (ROT) clause is a “contractual agreement according to which 
the seller retains title to the goods in question until the price has been paid in full.”1 It 
is a concept of remarkable simplicity, commonly used in the United Kingdom. The 
rationale for the widespread use of such clauses is clear. They are not geared to the 
“halcyon days of solvency”2 but are intended as “queue jumping devices,”3 aimed at 
protecting the seller in the event of a buyer’s insolvency. 
 
Although recent reforms have attempted to improve their lot,4 on insolvency the 
position of the unpaid seller is usually hopeless. Whilst reports of the complete 
demise of insolvency law have proved to be exaggerated,5 the doctrine of pari passu 
today remains an “illusory ideal.”6 Preferential creditors and floating charge holders 
still take precedence, leaving little for the unsecured creditors. Put bluntly, sellers of 
goods, as unsecured creditors, receive a “raw deal”.7 
 
A successful ROT clause however, gives the seller a proprietary right. This accords 
him super-priority status over all other creditors. He is no longer left “waiting for 
Godot”8, the goods are still his and he can claim them back. It is this close nexus with 
insolvency which makes ROT a “difficult and complex area….encompassing the law 
relating to sales of goods, bailment, agency, trusts, mortgages and charges and the 
principles of tracing.”9 The law in the UK is based on one extraordinary case and its 
aftermath.  
 
Aluminium Industrie Vaassen B.V v Romalpa Aluminium10 has been described as “the 
most important decision in commercial law this century”11. It introduced the concept 
of ‘extended reservation of title’ into English law. Although Romalpa still stands, the 
last 30 years have seen a steady erosion of many of the principles laid down by the 
Court of Appeal. The reasons behind this judicial response, particularly with regard to 
the proceeds clause, lie at the heart of this article. Equally important is the strange 
reticence which has been shown to the issue of legislative reform. It has been claimed 
                                                          
*Lecturer in Law, University of Hertfordshire.  
1 Directive on Combating Late Payment in Commercial Transactions Art 2 (3)  
2 Aluminium Industrie Vaassen B.V. v Romalpa Aluminium [1976] 1 W.L.R. 676 per Roskill LJ. 
3 Belcher, Beglan. Jumping the Queue JBL (1997) 
4 Enterprise Act 2002. Abolition of crown preference. Top slicing. 
5 Goode,R. The Death of Insolvency Law.(1980) 3 Co law 123 
6 Jeremie, J. Lazurus Arisen CompLaw 1995 16(4) 99-101 
7 Borden (UK) Ltd. V Scottish Timber Products Ltd. [1981] Ch.25 per Lord Tempelman 
8 Godot never comes. 
9 Insolvency Law and Practice. Report of the Review Committee. Chairman Sir Kenneth Cork 
10 Aluminium Industrie Vaassen B.V. v. Romalpa Aluminium [1976] 1 W.L.R. 676 
11 R.Goode Proprietary Rights and Insolvency in Sales Transactions 3rd Edition (Sweet & Maxwell) 
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that Romalpa represented “the chickens coming home to roost,”12 with English 
commercial law “paying the price for a century’s statutory inertia.”13   
 
Numerous committees over the last 35 years have advocated reform as part of a 
general scheme of registration for security interests. It is almost inexplicable that only 
extremely limited legislatitive reform has taken place.14 As well as analysing the 
current state of the law in the UK, comparisons with two other jurisdictions will be 
made. Particular emphasis is placed on the ingenuity of the German courts in 
developing the necessary framework to allow ‘proceeds clauses’. In the U.S.A 
attention is principally focussed on Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, an 
astonishing piece of legislation which altered the entire conceptual basis of 
proprietary security interests. It is submitted that the UK’s approach to reservation of 
title is not founded on sound legal principle. It is however, an inevitable consequence 
of very particular underlying political, economic and (above all) business 
considerations. 
 
Romalpa - Cat among the pigeons 
 
Possibly due to the influence of the principles of Roman law,15 the historical 
development of the ROT clause is most marked in continental jurisdictions. The 
concept of reservation of title itself however, is not alien to English law. In 1895, the 
House of Lords considered it merely another illustration of laissez-faire freedom of 
contract. If the contract showed that the parties intended title would not pass, there 
was “no rule or principle of law which prevents its being given effect.”16 This early 
judicial approval and the equally accommodating provisions of the Sale of Goods 
Act17 would appear to be fertile ground for the development of ROT. It is surprising 
therefore, that prior to 1976 the ROT clause was virtually unknown. Although 
conditional sale devices such as hire-purchase were commonplace, the novelty of 
ROT was that it enabled the buyer to deal with the goods ‘as his own.’ 
 
In England, ROT began with Romalpa and as a consequence, the phrase “Romalpa 
Clause” entered the English legal dictionary. Romalpa concerned the sale of 
aluminium foil. The defendant buyer went into liquidation still owing the plaintiff 
seller £122,000. The plaintiff sought to rely on the now infamous Clause 13:  
  
“The ownership of the material to be delivered by A.I.V. will only be 
transferred to purchaser when he has met all that is owing to A.I.V., no matter 
on what grounds.”  
 
It was successfully argued that this clause enabled recovery of the unsold foil, still in 
the buyer’s possession, valued at £50,000. Even more dramatically, Moccotta J. (and 
the Court of Appeal) considered the parties to be in a fiduciary relationship. This 
                                                          
12 Goode. Reverberations from Romalpa.The Times (1977) 
13 Ibid. 
14 Insolvency Act 1986 
15 Pennington (1978) ICLQ 
16 McEntire v Crossley [1895] AC 457 
17 S.17, S.19 SGA (1979). both provisions were also in the 1893 Act 
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enabled recovery of £35,000 in proceeds of sale, using the equitable18 doctrine of 
tracing established in Re Halletts Estate.19 Astonishingly, the proceeds clause itself 
was implied into the contract to give it business efficacy. Clause 13 only referred to 
the proceeds from the sale of products manufactured from the foil. 
 
The impact of this decision and its subsequent affirmation by the Court of Appeal was 
remarkable. Firstly, most lawyers were astonished to discover that the right to trace is 
available for both unauthorised and authorised dispositions.20 The legal surprise was 
dwarfed by the seismic shock felt by the banks, whose floating charges had been 
devalued overnight. Within months, new accounting procedures were introduced. 
These involved a “substance over form”21 approach, reflecting the very real 
possibility that goods subject to a Romalpa clause could no longer be considered part 
of a company’s assets. 
 
Fuel was added to the fire by the controversy surrounding the so called ‘Brentford 
Nylons affair’. This occurred shortly after Romalpa, but before its affirmation in the 
Court of Appeal. The case was never litigated and consequently is rarely referred to in 
legal journals. In the national press at the time however, it was headline news. The 
company ‘Brentford Nylons,’ a household name in clothing “aimed at the cheaper 
end of the market”22, had gone into receivership. Highly significantly, the official 
receiver was a Mr Kenneth Cork (as he was then). Mr Cork was initially optimistic 
that the company could remain viable and 2,500 jobs could be saved. This aim 
appeared to be thwarted when two suppliers threatened legal action to enforce their 
rights under similar clauses to those used in Romalpa. Although no details were ever 
disclosed, it was widely reported that Mr Cork had been compelled to strike a deal. 
Brentford Nylons were able to continue trading and the company was subsequently 
sold to Lonrho.  It was rumoured that the two suppliers had agreed not to pursue a 
court action in return for priority status as creditors. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the issue of Retention of Title became a top priority of the Insolvency 
Law Review Committee which, ironically, was chaired by Sir Kenneth Cork. No 
doubt alerted by the widespread publicity, traders immediately sought to take 
advantage of this newfound security. A great variety of clauses were incorporated in 
documents of sale and the “progeny of Romalpa”23 were soon before the courts.  
Broadly speaking, there are four different types of ROT clause:  
 
The ‘simple’ clause, whereby the seller retains title to the unchanged goods which are 
still in the buyer’s possession; the ‘manufactured goods’ clause, whereby the seller 
retains title to the goods even after they have undergone a manufacturing process; the 
‘proceeds clause’, whereby the seller is entitled to the proceeds of a sale of the goods 
to a third party; and finally the ‘all monies’ clause under which the seller retains title 
to the goods until all the debts owed by the seller to the buyer are extinguished. The 
subsequent hostility of the judiciary can be gauged with reference to any modern 
                                                          
18 There is also tracing at common law. 
19 (1880) 13 Ch.D. 696 
20 R.Goode Proprietary Rights and Insolvency in Sales Transactions (3rd ed Sweet & Maxwell) 
21 Belcher supra, n 3.  
22 Quigley, D. The Times February 24th 1976 
23 McCormack G. Reservation of Title. 2nd ed. 1995 Sweet & Maxwell. 
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precedent book. A prudent solicitor can nowadays only (safely) recommend the use of 
a “simple” or “all monies” clause.  
 
Although there are clear dicta from the Court of Appeal24 suggesting that 
manufacturing clauses are possible, “the practical outcome of a series of cases has 
put it beyond doubt that “extended” title reservation clauses will not work.”25 This 
article is principally concerned with ‘tracing of proceeds’ clauses which have been 
“particularly vulnerable”26 to judicial attack. In this jurisdiction Romalpa is the only 
successful example to date. 
 
The legal debate 
 
“We have found this a difficult and complex subject.”27 (Cork Report (1982)) 
 
This telling admission, by such an august body, is a reflection of the “maze, if not the 
minefield”28 of case law which has sprung up since Romalpa. It has been asserted that 
the authorities speak ‘with forked tongues’ making any meaningful analysis of the 
legal principles governing proceeds claims a “complete waste of time.”29 There is 
force in this claim as much of the case law is incoherent, inconsistent and illogical. 
More pragmatically, it is now almost impossible to “conceive of the circumstances”30 
in which a proceeds claim can succeed. It is however necessary to consider the 
general nature of the post-Romalpan legal debate in order to fully understand the 
underlying policy issues. The focal point of much of the case law has been the 
statutory requirements governing the registration of security interests or “rights in 
property that can be exercised to secure a payment or debt.”31 
 
In contradistinction with many other jurisdictions, there is no “general concept of a 
security interest in England.”32 Traditionally, the law recognises only four types of 
consensual security: pledges, contractual liens, charges and mortgages.33 These 
devices are all “clearly differentiated”34 from title retention. This distinction is of 
paramount importance. English Law requires that certain charges35 be perfected by 
registration. Failure to do so relegates the charge holder to the status of an unsecured 
creditor.  
 
Most of the case law is concerned with the s.395 Companies Act (1985) but similar 
statutory provisions also exist elsewhere.36 Although in many ways “economically 
                                                          
24 Clough Mills v Martin [1985] 1 WLR 111 per Goff LJ 
25 Bridge, McDonald, Simmonds & Walsh. 44 McGill L.J. 567 
26 Bourbon-Select,  C. (2005) 20(9), 419-425 JIBLR 
27 Insolvency Law and Practice. Cork Committee 1982 
28 Compaq Computers v Abercorn Group Ltd [1991] BCC 484 
29 McCormack supra. 
30 McCormack ibid. 
31 The Reform of the Law of Security Interests Aubrey Diamond Current Legal Problems. 1988 
32 Bridge supra. 
33 R.Goode Commercial Law. (Sweet & Maxwell) 2004  Also Millet LJ Re Coslett. 
34 Bridge supra. 
35 Confusingly, the term charge is often used generically to include mortgages. 
36 Bills of Sales Act 1882 
Hertfordshire Law Journal 4(2), 2-23  6 
ISSN 1479-4195 Online / ISSN 1479-4209 CDRom 
 
  
© William Davies  
The moral rights of the author have been asserted.  
Database rights The Centre for International Law (maker).  
 
 
and financially identical in effect”37 to a charge or a mortgage, there is no statutory 
requirement for ROT clauses to be registered. It has been successfully argued 
however, that ROT clauses are in fact “sham devices”38 masquerading as equitable 
charges. In Re.Bond Worth39 Slade J. went so far as to claim:  
 
“… any contract which, by way of security for the payment of a debt, confers an 
interest in property defeasible or destructible upon payment of such debt…. 
must necessarily be regarded as creating a mortgage or charge.”  
 
This sweeping statement of principle has been heavily criticised. Prima facie, taken to 
its natural conclusion, it infers that all unregistered retention of title clauses must be 
ineffective upon the insolvency of the buyer. This completely ignores not only the 
statutory40 freedom of contracting parties to decide when title passes, but also the 
clear authority of the House of Lords.41 In 1895, when invited to take a similar 
substance over form approach, their Lordships still concluded that title had not 
passed, looking instead to the true intention of the parties and the terms of the Bills of 
Sales Act.42  
 
In the case of simple ROT clauses (which purport to retain title to the 
unchanged/unmixed goods still in the possession of the buyer) it is now settled law 
that no charge is created.43 It had been claimed that the charge is created by the 
contract itself, a contract to which the buyer is a party.44 This view has been 
considered untenable for the simple reason that title to the goods never leaves the 
seller.45 Providing full legal title remains with the seller, the buyer simply does not 
have the capacity to create a charge. “As a matter of legal theory, a person cannot 
charge a legal estate that he does not have.”46Although the logic in Clough Mill has a 
beguiling simplicity, this approach has not been carried over to extended clauses.  
 
The problem centres on the exact nature of the relationship between the two parties. 
The ‘legendary concession’ in Romalpa that the companies were fiduciaries was 
critical. The orthodox view is that a fiduciary relationship is essential for tracing in 
equity.47 There appears to be no logical basis for this restriction however and it has 
been argued that the House of Lords should “put this fallacy firmly to rest.”48  
 
There is a doctrine of tracing at common law developed from the decision in Taylor v 
Plumer.49 Although it now seems to be acknowledged that Taylor v Plumer in fact 
                                                          
37 Diamond supra. 
38 Atiyah. The Sale of Goods 
39 Bond Worth Ltd, Re. [1980] Ch. 228 
40 S.17,S.19 SGA 
41 McEntire v Crossley supra  
42 (1882) 
43 Clough Mill v Martin [1985] 1 W.L.R. 111 
44 Tatung (UK) Ltd v Galex Telesure Ltd [1989] 5 BCC 325 
45 Diamond A. The Reform of the Law of Security Interests [1988] CLP 
46 Abbey National Building Society v Cann [1991] 1 AC 56 per Lord Oliver  
47 Re Diplock [1951] AC 251 
48 Goode. Commercial Law. (3rd ed. 2004 Lexis-Nexis) 
49 (1815) 3 M & S 562 
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involved equitable tracing,50 common law tracing is well established albeit through an 
historical accident. Common law tracing does not require a fiduciary relationship. In 
the context of ROT it does not appear to have been argued in the courts. Given the 
large number of post Romalpa decisions, this appears to be a startling omission. There 
are two possible reasons. Tracing at common law is limited by the need to keep the 
assets separate. Any mixing of the proceeds of sale with funds already in the buyer’s 
bank account would defeat the claim. For the same reason any mixture of the goods in 
a manufacturing process would also be fatal. Alternatively it could be argued that the 
fiduciary element has significance beyond the right to trace. It may be the only way 
that the seller and buyer will not be deemed to be in a debtor/creditor relationship, 
making a charge construction almost inevitable. 
 
On occasions the courts have gone to go to great lengths to find a fiduciary 
relationship. In Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew,51 Millet LJ candidly 
observed that he had: 
 
 “…been concerned to circumvent the supposed rule that there must be a 
fiduciary relationship or beneficial interest before resort may be had to the 
equitable rules.” 
 
This permissive approach has been notably absent in the post Romalpa case law. The 
courts have firstly struggled with classification. It must be acknowledged that much of 
the confusion stems from Romalpa itself. At first instance Moccotta J. considered 
there to be a bailment whereas the Court of Appeal argued in terms of agency. In 
Bond Worth, Slade J. raised doubts on the purported bailment construction. Relying 
on the Privy Council decision in South Australian Insurance Co. Ltd v Randell52 he 
concluded that under a bailment, the buyer was under an obligation to return the “very 
goods to the seller.” 
 
Although a separate line of authority does appear to support a different point of 
view,53 the bailment argument was dealt a further blow in Hendy Lennox and in Re 
Andrabell. These judgements clearly state that even if the parties were acting as 
bailor/bailee this does not necessitate a fiduciary relationship. In Clough Mill v 
Martin, Goff LJ adopted a more robust approach, stressing that the precise nature of 
the relationship was unimportant: 
 
 “In performing this task, concepts such as bailment and fiduciary duty must not 
be allowed to be our masters, but must rather be regarded as the tools of our 
trade.”54 
 
This approach, whilst possibly overly simplistic, does have certain attractions. The 
term fiduciary is clearly “incapable of comprehensive definition.”55 Furthermore, 
although the law has classed many different types of relationship as ‘fiduciary’ 
                                                          
50 FC Jones & Sons v Jones [1997] Ch 159 per Millet LJ 
51 Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 
52 (1869) LR 3 PC 101 
53 Re Smith (1879) Ch D 566 
54 Clough Mill v Martin [1985] 1 W.L.R. per Goff L.J. 
55 Law Commission. Consultation Paper No.142  Shareholders Remedies 
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(trustee/beneficiary, director/company, solicitor/client, mother/child), the categories 
are not closed. Strictly speaking there was no need to classify the relationship between 
the buyer and seller under a Romalpa clause within any existing fiduciary class. There 
appears to be no reason why a Romalpa clause cannot create a sui generis fiduciary 
relationship. Strangely this does not seem to have been argued before the courts. 
Despite the inherent flexibility of equity, the courts have found the fiduciary 
relationship elusive: 
 
“The idea that a fiduciary relationship existed but that the buyer was free to deal 
with the proceeds of sale as he wished, unless and until he became insolvent, is 
difficult to reconcile with traditional ideas of a fiduciary.”56  
 
The view has also been propagated that a fiduciary relationship, with its “defining 
feature of loyalty,” is inconsistent with a commercial agreement between parties 
dealing at arms length.57 In the cut throat world of commerce, companies look after 
their own interests. Although this argument has force, in practice the courts have 
found little difficulty in inferring fiduciary relationships in the context of the 
Quistclose trust.  
 
In Hendy Lennox58 the clause failed because there was no express obligation on the 
buyers to store the goods in such a way that they were clearly the property of the 
buyer. There was also no mention of a ‘fiduciary owner’. In Re Andrabell59 the clause 
failed because the buyer was able to claim the profits from the sale, whereas in 
Romalpa the effect of the clause was to give the profits to the supplier. This aspect of 
Romalpa is surely one of the most confusing. It is submitted that as yet, no 
satisfactory explanation has been provided. If a proceeds clause is considered to be a 
restitutionary claim, it is arguable that in this respect the Re Andrabell clause makes 
more sense. In such a scenario there is no “undeserved windfall” for the seller and the 
excess profits could be paid to the other creditors. On the other hand, if the seller does 
still have full ownership rights over the goods, he is entitled to take the full payment. 
The question of unjust enrichment simply does not arise. This approach is clearly 
supported by the reasoning of the House of Lords decision in the leading authority on 
equitable tracing.60  
 
One of the most extraordinary post Romalpa judgements was given in Highway Foods 
International Limited, Re (1995).61 The deputy high court judge, Mr Edward Nugee 
Q.C., followed the trend in distinguishing Romalpa by finding that the proceeds 
clause constituted an unregistered charge. The case was however complicated by a 
further ROT clause which had been included by the buyer when the goods had been 
sold on to a third party. It was held that the original seller was entitled to the return of 
the goods from the third party. This clearly flies in the face of all the post Romalpa 
case law. Applying the Bond Worth reasoning, at the moment the goods were sold on, 
the reservation of title should have been extinguished and replaced by a charge. One 
                                                          
56 Cooper, G. Columbia Business Law Review (1987) 17 
57 Panesar, P. ICCLR (2005) 16(12), 479-484 
58 Hendy Lennox v Puttnick [1984] 1 W.L.R. 485 
59 Andrabell Ltd, Re [1984] All E.R. 407 
60 Foskett v McKeon [1998] Ch 265 
61 [1995] 1 BCLC 209 
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of the grounds given for this decision was that there had only been an agreement to 
sell between the buyer and the third party.  
 
Even in this area of law it is very difficult to justify this decision on legal principle 
alone. It is however, a rare decision which appears to have done justice to the parties. 
The only alternative results would have given an undeserved windfall to either the 
receiver or the third party, neither of whom had paid for the goods. Possibly the most 
illuminating62 judgement concerned a clause which had clearly been carefully drafted 
to take account of all the post-Romalpa case law: 
 
“Insofar as the dealer may sell or dispose of the Compaq products or receive any 
monies from any third party in respect of Compaq products, he shall strictly 
account to Compaq for the full proceeds thereof (such monies as the dealer shall 
receive) as the seller’s bailee or agent and shall keep a separate account of all 
the proceeds or monies for such purpose.” 
 
Faced with this clause Mummery J. demonstrated the innate circularity of the whole 
debate. He simply reverted back to the purposive approach adopted by Slade J in 
Bond Worth: 
 
“… any contract which, by way of security for the payment of a debt, confers an 
interest in property defeasible or destructible upon payment of such debt…. 
must necessarily be regarded as creating a mortgage or charge.”  
 
It is submitted that to rationalise the modern attitude of the courts the following 
assumptions must be made: 1) Simple ROT clauses do not require registration; 2) 
Proceeds Clauses inevitably become charges at the moment the goods are sold on; and 
3) The distinguishing of Romalpa is plainly disingenuous. The only possible 
conclusion is that the present judiciary consider it to be wrongly decided. Although it 
could be said that the courts are following the equitable maxim of “looking to intent 
rather than form”63 it has been noted that much of the arguments (particularly about 
fiduciaries) has been highly “redolent of formalism.”64 
 
In many ways the logic of Romalpa is clearly not beyond reproach. It is astonishing 
that the only tracing (proceeds) claim to succeed in English law was implied into the 
contract. The exact nature of the fiduciary relationship was never determined. (Clause 
13 coined the “unhappy term”65 – “fiduciary  owner”). Nevertheless it is submitted 
that criticism of Moccotta J.’s first instance decision has been overly harsh. Here was 
a judge, sitting alone, confronted with four different types of ROT clause, the validity 
of which had never been tested in any English court. Although he chose to extend the 
concepts of bailment and equitable tracing further than their conventional limits, this 
was done to honour the contractual obligations of the parties. Furthermore, as far as 
legal form is concerned, based on the existing law at the time, there is no definitive 
answer as to whether the Romalpa tracing clause should have succeeded. Romalpa 
                                                          
62 Compaq Computer Ltd v Abercorn Group Ltd [1991] B.C.C. 484 
63 Hanbury & Martin , Modern Equity  16th ed. Sweet & Maxwell, London 2001 at p.30 
64 McCormack supra. 
65 Romalpa supra. Per Roskill LJ. 
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was a novel situation in English law. Moccotta J. was entitled to take a novel 
approach. 
 
Given the inherent flexibility of English law, the weight of criticism based purely on 
legal (and equitable) principles is surprising. That peculiarly English invention, the 
floating charge and the conceptually uncertain Quistclose66 trust are symbolic of the 
courts boundless ingenuity in “championing security interests and their enforcement, 
sometimes even at the expense of logic.”67 The answer clearly does not lie in the 
substance over form argument. On the one hand a proceeds clause does serve the 
purpose of a security interest. To classify it as a charge however is to ignore it’s other 
‘form’; a contractual agreement between two parties dealing at arms length, 
underpinned by statute. It is plain that the courts will not countenance a repeat of 
Romalpa. The rationale for this reluctance however must lie outside the legal 
textbooks. 
 
The Jurisprudence of Romalpa 
 
Since the dawn of the modern company, with its limited liability and separate legal 
identity, there has been sympathy for the plight of the unsecured creditor:  
 
“I have long thought … that the ordinary trade creditors of a trading company 
ought to have a preferential claim on the assets in liquidation in respect of debts 
incurred within a certain limited time before the winding-up. But that is not the 
law at present. Everybody knows that when there is a winding-up debenture-
holders generally step in and sweep off everything; and a great scandal it is.”68 
 
Similar judicial hand-wringing was also evident even as the first chinks in the armour 
of Romalpa were being exposed: 
 
“It is not therefore surprising that this court looked with sympathy on an 
invention designed to provide some protection for one class of unsecured 
creditors, namely unpaid sellers of goods.”69 
 
However, contained within this very paragraph is one of the most cited policy reasons 
for the denial of Romalpa:  
 
“There is no logical reason why this class of creditor should be favoured as 
against other (unsecured) creditors such as the suppliers of consumables and 
services.” 
 
Prima facie this appears to be a strong argument. Retention of title, by definition, can 
only work with goods. It is of no utility to providers of services. A point rarely made 
is that it is also no use for certain goods. There is little benefit in reserving title to an 
                                                          
66 Barclays Bank v Quistclose Investments Ltd [1970] A.C. 567 
67 The Reform of English Personal Property Law  Iwan Davies Legal Studies 2004, Society of Legal 
Scholars 
68 Salomon v Salomon (1897) AC 22 per Lord MacNaughten 
69 Borden (UK) Ltd v Scottish Timber Products Ltd. [1981] Ch.25 per Tempelman LJ 
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ice cream.70 For this reason, ROT clauses have been considered unfair and even 
immoral.71 These objections however, appear to ignore the harsh realities of 
commercial life. The simple fact is that valid Romalpa clauses make no difference at 
all to the other unsecured creditors. They will receive no compensation in any event. 
Unless they react like Aesop’s dog in the manger,  
 
“…unsecured creditors will take no comfort from compelling a restitutionary 
claimant to join their ranks if preferred or secured creditors, or both, will, in any 
event, scoop the debtor’s assets.”72  
 
Concerns were initially raised both by the first instance Romalpa decision and 
particularly by the ‘Brentford Nylons’ saga, that ROT clauses (of all varieties) made 
the task of receivers impossible. “It is regarded in the profession as a potential threat 
to receivership in any company that depends on a manufacturing process.”73 Similar 
issues came to the fore in Leyland Daf v Automotive Products Ltd.74 The receivers 
were faced with nearly four hundred ROT claims. Two of the companies concerned 
refused to continue supplying Leyland Daf unless their combined debts of £758,955 
were satisfied. At that time Automotive Products were the only company capable of 
providing the requisite products (brake cables). This prompted the receiver to bring an 
action under the EU’s competition legislation, claiming that Automotive Products 
were abusing a dominant position.75 The Court of Appeal dismissed the claim, 
holding that the ROT clause was a legitimate part of AP’s bargaining power. 
 
This appears to suggest that the concerns are not unfounded. To affect a sale of a 
struggling company, a receiver requires the company to continue trading long enough 
for him to identify a suitable buyer. This requires the remaining assets of the company 
to be kept intact. More cynical observers have suggested that the role of the receiver 
was in fact more encumbered by another problem. Prior to the enactment of the 
Enterprise Act (2002), a receiver could be appointed by the floating charge holders. 
Therefore, although nominally acting on behalf of all the creditors, the receiver was 
only answerable to the banks. This meant that the interests of the bank generally 
determined the time of any sale. The receiver was fully entitled to affect an immediate 
sale satisfying the bank’s claim, even if a delay would have been beneficial to the 
remaining creditors.76 
 
Plainly the most fundamental concern raised by Romalpa was that a “proliferation of 
extended clauses would strike at the very heart of the system of credit.”77 This is a 
serious concern. Credit is the driving force of most western economies. It is often 
baldly stated that it is the banks whose interests are most affected by the Romalpa 
clause. Although this is correct in part, there were clear ramifications for other types 
of financial institution.  
                                                          
70 Example given by Brethertons solicitors. Commercial Law Website. 
71 Tribe J. Insolvency Law & Practice, Vol. 17, No.5, 2001 
72 Bridge, MacDonald, Simmonds & Walsh. 44 McGill L.J. 567 
73 Walters M. The Times. March 6th 1976 
74 [1993] BCC 389 
75 Article 86 EC (Now Article 82) 
76 Re Charnley Davies [1990] BCC 484 
77 McCormnack supra. 
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Concerns were expressed for the effect which Romalpa would have on agreements for 
factoring debt. This is a multi billion pound industry in the UK. Many companies ‘sell 
their sales invoices’ to financial institutions who take over the task of reclaiming the 
debt. The main advantages of such arrangements include the immediate access of up 
to 90% of the price of the goods sold and release from the costly and time consuming 
exercise of debt recovery.78  
 
The fears of the factoring industry may well have been allayed by the decision in 
Pfeiffer.79  Phillips J. held (obiter) that the rule in Dearle v Hall80 applied. As the 
factor was the only party to have given notice of his interest, the subsequent factoring 
agreement took priority over the extended proceeds clause. The Romalpa clause has 
been deemed to be unfair to the banks because, unlike the floating charge, it 
circumvents the registration requirement of the Companies Act (1985). The very 
purpose of registration is to afford transparency to third parties. Therefore, when 
lending money to a company, a financial institution has no means of knowing whether 
any of the assets are subject to a ROT clause. This is particularly so in the case of 
‘proceeds clauses’ where, after the goods are sold on, the assets will be in the 
intangible form of money.  
 
The other closely related objection is that the ROT clause, if successful, confers a 
priority over the banks floating charge. Although these arguments have force, 
justifications exist for both the lack of registration and the super priority status. The 
ROT clause: 
 
“…circumscribe the assets which can be used to give security; consequently 
there is no priority conflict between holders of restitutionary proprietary rights 
or title reservations and secured creditors.”81  
 
The simplistic approach adopted in various judgements, that certain extended clauses 
are perfectly legitimate, provided they are registered as charges, is also deeply flawed. 
Aside from the conceptual issues mentioned in the previous chapter, there are also 
intractable practical difficulties. If a proceeds clause really does constitute a floating 
charge, in principle it can be registered. There is however, no authority suggesting 
that this has ever happened. This is hardly surprising. Firstly, it is highly impractical 
for a seller to insist on the registration of a charge on every separate transaction. The 
registrar also requires information on exactly when the charge is created.82 The law is 
unclear as to when an ROT clause becomes a charge. Even if the assumption is made 
that the charge is created at the moment of sale to a third party, there are still 
insurmountable difficulties. The seller is unlikely to have knowledge of the onward 
sale and will have no power to insist that the buyer registers the charge. 
 
The Romalpa jurisprudence has been influenced by many of the issues discussed 
above. It would appear however, that some of these points are no longer relevant. The 
initial problems facing receivers were remedied by the Insolvency Act (1986) 
                                                          
78 Information from Lloyds Bank & Royal Bank of Scotland Websites. 
79 Pfeiffer Weinkellerei-Weineinkauf GmbH Co v Artbuthnot Factors Ltd [1988] 1 W.L.R. 150 
80 Dearle v Hall (1838) 3 Russ 1 
81 Bridge supra. 
82 s.403 1A (a) Companies Act 1985 
Hertfordshire Law Journal 4(2), 2-23  13 
ISSN 1479-4195 Online / ISSN 1479-4209 CDRom 
 
  
© William Davies  
The moral rights of the author have been asserted.  
Database rights The Centre for International Law (maker).  
 
 
following the recommendations made in the Cork report. In any event the Enterprise 
Act (2002) has significantly altered the role of the receiver. If the various obiter dicta 
can be relied on, factoring agreements may have priority over extended clauses. The 
remaining objection of principle to the proceeds clause stems from its lack of 
registration. Bearing this in mind it is appropriate at this point to consider the situation 
in two other jurisdictions. In Germany, where there is also no requirement of 
registration and in the U.S.A, where legislation has revolutionised the whole area of 




It has been noted that there are some similarities between German and English law.83 
The historical development of ROT in Germany however, was very different. All the 
western European legal systems (apart from England) were dominated by the 
principles of Roman law until the sixteenth century. Under Roman law there was no 
reason to insert retention of title clauses into a contract. The basic principle appears to 
be that “even if the seller had delivered the goods to the buyer, the seller retained 
dominium until the price was fully paid.”84 
 
In Germany, at some undefined point in time, this principle must have changed. The 
first codification of Prussian law in 1784 clearly states that ownership passes on 
delivery, irrespective of whether the purchase price has been paid.85 However this was 
only a presumption which could be rebutted if the seller had “expressly agreed to give 
credit.”86 This further provision facilitated retention of title. 
 
The reasons for its rapid early development are essentially economic and relate to the 
availability of credit. In the early 19th century the UK was already the most ‘credit 
prone’ country in the world. In Germany meanwhile, the banking system was not 
sufficiently developed to cope with the increased demand of the industrial age. As a 
consequence, ROT developed as a cheap and simple alternative to borrowing money. 
Its status was greatly enhanced by a huge increase87 in the use of ROT clauses in the 
harsh economic times following the First World War. Their widespread popularity has 
lasted to this day. 
 
Originally ROT seems to have been used primarily for conveyances of land. When 
more appropriate devices were developed however,88 its utility was soon spotted by 
dealers of movable goods. Although in many ways ROT represented a 
“circumvention of various German statutes which only recognised a cumbersome 
form of bailment”89, the enthusiasm with which it has been embraced by the German 
courts is illuminating. 
                                                          
83 Re Weldtech [1991] BCC 16 per Hoffmann J. 
84 Retention of Title to the Sale of Goods under European Law  Pennington ICLQ 1978 
85 Prussian Allgemeines Landrecht, First Part, Title 7, s.58 and Title 10 s.1 and Pennington Supra 
86 Pennington supra. Allgemeines Landrecht Title 5 & Title 11 
87 Eigentumsvorbehalt und Abzahlungsgeschaft. Yale Law Journal No.4 Feb, (1932) 653-654 
88 Monti,Neuman & Reuter ICCLQ (1997) Vol 46 No 4 866-907 
89 Monti supra. 
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Apart from an attempt by certain southern states to legislate against ROT in the early 
19th century,90 this judicial activism has been largely tolerated by the legislature. Since 
1900 the sole statutory authority for retention of title has stemmed from a single 
provision of the German Civil Code:91  
 
“If the seller of a movable has retained title until payment of the purchase price, 
it is to be presumed, in case of doubt, that the transfer of title takes place subject 
to the condition precedent of payment in full of the purchase price and the seller 
is entitled to rescind the contract if the purchaser is in default with the 
payment.” 
 
Like s.19 Sale of Goods Act (1979), this appears, on a strict construction, to cover 
‘simple’ clauses only. The German courts however, have extended the principle to 
cover all four main types of ROT clause. All of these are ‘insolvency proof’ and none 
require registration or notarisation. In Germany, reservation of title is clearly a 
powerful weapon. Unlike English law,92 the intention of the parties is not paramount. 
The sale and the passing of property are governed by separate provisions of the Civil 
Code.93 The contract of sale is governed by the Schuldrecht (or law of obligations). 
The passing of property however is governed by the Sachenrecht (or law “governing 
the relationship between people and goods”).94 When a ROT clause is incorporated it 
operates on both Schuldrecht and Sachenrecht. From an English perspective the most 
interesting facet of the whole transaction is that despite the seller’s retention of title, 
the buyer does have a limited right to the goods even before the purchase price has 
been paid. What is even more remarkable is that this right (Anwartschaftsrecht or 
inchoate ownership) is a purely judicial creation. Although “there does not exist a 
common opinion”95 the right resembles a proprietary right in that it can be transferred 
or pledged. 
 
The success of the German courts in developing this right within the “extremely 
formalistic” confines of the BGB compares favourably with the English courts 
inability to find a fiduciary relationship, despite the flexibility of equity. Third parties 
buying in good faith are protected under 932 BGB: 
 
 “If a thing sold . . . does not belong to the disposer, the acquirer becomes the 
owner, if the thing is delivered to him by the disposer, unless he is not in good 
faith at this time.”  
 
Retention of title is so commonplace in Germany that this protection has lost much of 
its efficacy. As it is highly likely that the goods will be the subject to a ROT clause a 
much higher degree of proof is required to establish a purchaser’s good faith. German 
companies have encountered difficulties enforcing ROT clauses in the UK. It appears 
that even an express choice of law provision nominating German law is of no 
                                                          
90 Monti supra 
91 BGB 455 
92 S.17 SGA 1979 
93 433-513 & 929-936 
94 Monti, Neuman & Reuter ICLQ  Vol.46 No.4 (1997) 866-907 
95 Rutgers. International Reservation of Title Clauses. (T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague 1999) 
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assistance. Although no direct96 authority exists, it is assumed that ROT clauses, as 
proprietary rights, are governed by the lex situs. Even more fundamentally, the courts 
have refused to allow choice of law clauses to circumvent the registration 
requirements of the Companies Act 1985.97 
 
Despite these inevitable problems of inter state trade, even the strongest Romalpa 
sceptic might well concede that ROT works well in Germany. Two hundred years of 
proceeds clauses have not prevented Germany from becoming the third largest 
economy in the world. It is an economy noted for its strong manufacturing base and 
high quality exports. The lack of registration and the generally super priority status of 
ROT simply do not create the same level of legal and academic concern in Germany. 
Any injustice to lending institutions is clearly considered incidental to the wider 
commercial good.  
 
In England the development of such devices as the super lightweight floating charge 
and the judicial acquiescence of the Quistclose trust demonstrate the courts desire to 
protect the interests of the banking sector. In Germany the policy has been to support 
the seller of goods and the manufacturing industry. Whilst such a dichotomy exists 
there would appear to be no prospect of the German approach finding favour with the 
English courts. The proposals for reform in the UK have centred on legislation aimed 
at enabling sellers to protect their interests within a readily accessible system of 
registration. The jurisprudential template for all of these proposals originates from the 
United States of America. 
 
The United States of America  
 
In the United States of America, the law relating to reservation of title is now 
governed by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. By any reckoning, the 
adoption of the U.C.C. represents an astonishing achievement. The brainchild of a 
group of legal theorists such as Karl Llewellyn and Grant Gilmore, it represented the 
complete codification of commercial law and its subsequent adoption by all fifty 
states in the union.98  
 
Article 9 is regarded by many as “the crowning achievement of the UCC project, and 
perhaps of the entire uniform law enterprise.”99 Fifty years on it is still considered by 
many to be a legislative triumph, particularly in relation to its “logical and flowing 
treatment of security interests.”100 The central themes of Article 9 have provided the 
template for similar enactments around the globe. Although most of these have taken 
place in common law systems, the enactment of the provision in Louisiana has 
fulfilled Professor Diamond’s prediction that there appears to be “no basic difficulty 
for a civil law system in adopting Article 9.”101 In the UK every major proposal for 
reform has been based on this model. 
                                                          
96 Trade Credit Finance No (1) Ltd v Bilgin (2004) All ER (d) 47 provided a very strong obiter 
97 Re Weldtech per Hoffmann J. 
98 Louisiana (a civil law system) adopted the Article 9 in 1992 
99 Janger. Predicting when the Uniform law process will fail. 1998 Iowa Law Review 
100 Formalism, Functionalism and Understanding the law of Secured Transactions.Bridge, MacDonald, 
Simmonds and Walsh. 44McGill L.J. 567 
101 Diamond. The reform of the Law of Security Interests Current Legal Problems 1988 
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Much of the appeal of Article 9 was that the law it replaced was considered to be a 
contradictory jumble of law and statute, understood neither by the lawyer or the 
businessman. A full analysis of pre-code American law is beyond the scope of this 
article; suffice to say the first draftsmen of the code pulled no punches in describing 
its deficiencies. “The law may be described as closely resembling that obscure wood 
in which Dante discovered the gates of hell.”102  
 
Article 9 was revolutionary in that it effectively marginalised the concept of title when 
determining the proprietary rights to movable goods. Title was considered to be “too 
theoretical and static a concept to be efficient.”103 Karl Llewellyn believed it was 
farcical to imagine that in the location of such an abstract concept could be 
determined by the perceived intentions of the contracting parties: 
 
“Now, when the location of ‘the property’ in the wares goes far enough away 
from homely fact to need a lawyer to decide about it, but is supposed to be 
decided by the intentions of the parties who are not lawyers, this is not so 
good.”104  
 
Article 9 was intended as a new pragmatic approach, reflecting the reasonable 
expectations of the contracting parties whilst remaining sensitive to the interests of 
third parties. At its heart lay the revolutionary concept of the unitary security interest. 
The code’s drafters believed that although there were various forms of security 
interest such as chattel mortgage, conditional sale, trust receipts and pledges, they all 
performed a similar function. It was therefore considered logical to apply a single set 
of regulations rather than separate rules governed by theoretical conceptions. The 
concept of retention of title in the USA, in one sense at least, has therefore ceased to 
exist. Article 2 states that: 
 
 “Any retention or reservation by the seller of the title (property) in goods 
shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation of a 
security interest.”105  
 
An ROT clause therefore, creates a security interest in exactly the same way as a 
charge. It will be noted how closely this accords with the substance over form 
approach adopted by the English courts when deciding that proceeds clauses are 
disguised charges. To be effective, the security interest must be perfected by 
registration. The system has been described as ‘notice filing’. It differs from the 
system of registration for the Companies Act (1985) in several important respects. 
The registration does not have to relate to a specific transaction. It can cover all 
transactions between the parties over the next five years. Put simply, a ROT clause is 
capable of registration in America but not in England. The general rule is that those 
registering “first in time” will be granted priority. Retention of title clauses can 
nevertheless achieve an enhanced priority if they are registered as Purchase Money 
Security Interests (PMSI’s). 
                                                          
102 Gilmore, G. The Good Faith Idea and the Uniform commercial Code 15 Ga, L. Rev 605, 620 (1981) 
103 Tabac, W. The Unbearable Lightness of Title. Maryland Law Review. Winter (1991) 
104 Karl Llewellyn. Across Sales on Horse Back. 53 Harv. L.Rev. 725 (1939) 
105 U.C.C. Section 2-401 (1) 
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A PMSI is a security interest designed to “secure payment of the goods themselves 
and does not extend to other purchases.”106 This concept, which is not alien to 
English law, is clearly sufficiently broad to cover both simple and proceeds clauses. 
The special exemption from the ‘first in line’ rule is premised on the fact that the 
assets charged are effectively ring fenced. The new assets are “cancelled by the debt 
for the price. The transaction is essentially neutral in character.”107 
 
The Uniform Code is not without its critics. Many commentators claim that even with 
its recent ‘restatement’ it has not kept up with the times, particularly with regard to 
security transactions in electronic form. There are also concerns108 that the revised 
legislation does nothing to address issues of ‘distributive justice’. This relates to 
concerns that a further raft of creditors such as employees and ‘tort victims’ are 
unable to take advantage of Article 9. A similar suggestion to the recently enacted 
‘top slicing’ provisions in the Enterprise Act (2002) was not included in the revised 
code. 
 
Whilst these are legitimate concerns, such problems are also evident in the UK. Some 
claim that the worst defect of Article 9 is its attempt to move away from the concept 
of title - “the pole star which had guided the development of property law into the 
twentieth century.”109 Grant Gilmore claimed that the unitary concept would cause a 
“stench in the nostrils of legal purists.”110 This prediction appears belatedly to have 
become true. Over the past decade there have been a number of academic articles 
claiming that the purported abandonment of ‘title theory’ was conceptually unsound. 
The legislative designation of reservation of title as a security interest has been taken 
as an implicit acknowledgement that the concept of property remains intact.111  
 
The recognition of devices such as the PMSI is another, often cited illustration of the 
durability of a proprietary right at odds with the unitary concept of a security interest. 
It is submitted that this entirely misses the point. The draftsmen of the code were fully 
aware of the conceptual differences between security interests and quasi securities 
such as ROT. Using the ultimate tool of statutory intervention was simply a method of 
ignoring form and recognising function. 
 
Although Article 9 is plainly not perfect, it does demonstrate how ROT can be 
accommodated within a logically structured system of security interest regulation. 
There is no doubt that Article 9 places a bureaucratic burden on the seller of goods. It 
has been claimed that a “total registration requirement for all retention of title 
clauses would be extremely onerous and burdensome.”112 These concerns appear to 
be exaggerated however, particularly in the light of modern advances in electronic 
filing. In any event such a burden appears to be a small price to pay for protection 
                                                          
106 Diamond supra. 
107 Diamond ibid. 
108 Janger supra. 
109 Tabac. The Unbearable Lightness of Title. Maryland Law Review. (1991) Md.L.Rev 408 
110 Gilmore supra. 
111 Schroeder. Death & Transfiguration:The myth that the UCC killed “property” Temple Law Review 
(1996) 
112 Tribe,J. Insolvency Law & Practice, Vol 17, No.5, 2001 
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from the trustee in insolvency. As Article 9 appears to address many of the concerns 
expressed over the extended ROT clause in England, the reasons for the lack of 




Reform of this area of the law has been proposed for many years. The 
Crowther113committee proposed adopting a similar scheme to Article 9 in 1971. 
Although much of the report’s proposals were enacted in the Consumer Credit Act 
(1974), the opportunity to reform the law of security interests two years prior to 
Romalpa was not taken. This was followed by the Cork report, which found the 
“absence of any provisions requiring disclosure of reservation of title clauses to be 
unsatisfactory and should be remedied as soon as possible.”114 There were 
submissions made that ROT clauses should be simply declared ineffective on 
insolvency. The committee felt however, that sellers were entitled to protect 
themselves and “it would be wrong to deny them the protection that they sought.” 
Taking much the same stance as Crowther, it concluded that registration was the 
answer and the practical difficulties of establishing such a scheme were exaggerated. 
Nevertheless the only reforms which came out of Cork were restrictions on the use of 
ROT clauses in the Insolvency Act (1986). These included a 12-month moratorium on 
the enforcement of the clause during which time the administrator is entitled to deal 
with the goods in a manner “inconsistent with the title of the supplier.”115  
 
This was followed by the Diamond116 report which built on the previous proposals but 
suggested that simple ROT clauses did not require registration as they are “not 
detrimental to other creditors.”117 The 2004 Law Commission Consultative Report 
found that there was evidence that the UCC and PPSA schemes “are regarded as very 
successful.”118 Particular attention was paid to the Canadian province of Ontario, 
whose economy was considered comparable for its “complexity and 
sophistication.”119 The major criticism raised by this scheme was that it should 
actually be extended to cover leases. Submissions were made that introduction of a 
unitary scheme meant that contractually agreed  rights would be re-classified contrary 
to the expressed wishes of the parties. 
 
Whilst recognising that this was correct, the Law Commission claimed that there were 
a number of advantages in such a re-classification. As it was considered that the law is 
“already riddled with exceptions”120 to the nemo dat rule, the perceived problem of 
the supplier’s loss of title to the goods was believed to be ‘overstated’. In a side swipe 
at legal purists the report also stated that; “What to lawyers may be a painful change 
                                                          
113 Report of the Committee on Consumer Credit (1971, Cmnd 4596) 
114 Insolvency Law and Practice. Report of the Review Committee. Para.1639 
115 McCormack supra. 
116 A Review of Security Interests in Property, A L Diamond (DTI,1989) 
117 Brown. Commercial Law. (Butterworths London 2001) 
118 Law Commission 176 2.129 
119 Law Commission 176 2.129 
120 Law Commission 176 Para. 2.108 
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to familiar conceptual structures may be precisely the practical relief that industry 
needs.”121 
 
The Report also tackled the issue of surplus. This area has caused a great deal of 
debate. One of the most unclear aspects of the post-Romalpa case law is whether the 
supplier is entitled to the return of the profits on top of the purchase price. Under an 
Article 9 type scheme, any profit would be returned to the debtor. Although this 
would also be a “major wrench to current concepts,”122 it would bring much needed 
clarity to this area. On the basis of research, the Law Commission also concluded that 
‘retention title financiers’ only wished to recover the sum owed and were not 
interested in any windfall. In this penultimate consultation paper it did appear that 
retention of title was finally going to be included in a new Bill regulating company 
security interests.  
 
All such hopes were dashed in August 2005. Astonishingly, a full 35 years after the 
publication of the Crowther report, the proposal to include ROT within the Company 
Security Interests scheme was shelved because it “merited further attention.”123 
Opposition to the proposed legislation came from “practitioners and the finance 
industry.”124 It is remarkable that the very organisations, on behalf of whom the 
courts are insisting that extended ROT clauses be registered, appear to be the major 
opponents to reform. 
 
This unhelpful attitude bears a striking resemblance to the opposition of the U.S. 
banking sector in the early days of the Uniform Commercial Code. Although the 
“influence of the banking industry has been widely noted in the drafting of each of 
these provisions”125 and despite many compromises and concessions made by the 
draftsmen, it is well documented that the American banks fought tooth and nail 
against the code’s implementation. The most radical articles within the code (Article 4 
and Article 9) were even branded “communist inspired.”126 For such an accusation to 
be made in 1953 gives a good indication of the vitriolic nature of the debate. 
 
The banks’ position was that there was no need for the code at all, preferring the 
existing patchwork of laws and their own self regulation. This view was memorably 
castigated by one of the early draftsmen as “taking a good joke too far.”127 It is a 
measure of the extraordinary tenacity of the codes founders that full implementation 
of the code, from its first enactment in Pennsylvania to its adoption by Louisiana, took 
forty one years. The situation in the UK is clearly comparable. Resistance to change 
from “banks and financial institutions to the chattel security systems presented by 
Article 9”128 probably stems from the fact that the banks are already extremely well 
protected through charges on book debts, floating charges and by the current judicial 
hostility towards the extended ROT clause. 
                                                          
121 Ibid. 
122 Law Commission 176 Para.2.110 
123 Law Com.176 supra 
124 ibid 
125 Rasmussen Louisiana Law Review (2002) 62 La.L.Rev 1097 
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127 Kamp A.Buffalo Law Review Winter (2001) 49 Buffalo L.Rev 359  
128 Davies I. The new lex Mercatoria Jan (2003) ICLQ 17 
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Such reforms have succeeded elsewhere. The Newfoundland Personal Property 
Security Act was enacted in 1999 which “represented the culmination of similar 
enactments over the last 20 years in the common law states of Canada.”129 This 
legislation was also controversial and again strongly opposed by the financial 
institutions. Reform however was successfully achieved. One commentator gave a 
valuable insight into the drive for reform:  
 
“PPSAs are not the product of a demand for change from the Canadian finance 
industry. They are the result of the conclusions on the part of a few 
practitioners, academics and government officials that modernisation of this 
area of Canadian Commercial Law would produce significant benefits for many 
Canadians. The North American experience illustrates that powerful interest 
groups can have a significant impact on the reform or otherwise of domestic 
secured credit law.”130 
 
In the UK it is submitted that the only interest group with sufficient power to 
influence the legislation is the banks. As the banks already have:  
 
 “…obtained all the freedom it needs to make its position ironclad, it is therefore 
hardly surprising that they are not pressing for reform along the lines of Article 
9.”131  
 
The influence of the banking ‘lobby’ in the sphere of corporate insolvency has been 
described as “phenomenal.”132 A recent example of this concerned the introduction of 
the Enterprise Act.  In a last minute volte face, the government was persuaded that the 
“brave new reforms would only affect debentures created after the coming into force 
of the new legislation.”133 The argument which prompted this astonishing about turn 
was based on the premise that banks are considered to be ‘persons’ for the purposes of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. It was contended that if previously 
created debentures were to fall within the ambit of the Act, this would breach the 
banks’ rights under Article 1 of the First Protocol. The ambit of Article 1 has proved 
to be very wide and it is a formidable provision. (Two recent decisions have stood the 
law relating to adverse possession on its head.)134 Even so, the state does have wide 
powers of derogation and it is testament to the lobbying power of the banks that the 
government caved in so meekly.  
On a final note it is instructive to consider the attempts at harmonising the disparate 
systems currently regulating ROT within the European Union. As much of the early 
litigation involved UK companies trading with our European partners (particularly 
with Germany), a pan European system of regulation would be highly appropriate. 
Such a system would also facilitate one of the EU’s most vaunted aims-The free 
movement of goods. If anything however, the EU’s attempts at reform have been 
slightly more inept than those in the UK. 
                                                          
129 Ibid. 
130 Iwan Davies. The New Lex Mercatoria Jan (2003) ICLQ 17 
131 Bridge, M. How far is Article 9 Exportable? The English Experience (1996) 27 Can.Bus.L.J. 
132 Stephen Davies QC Insolvency and the Enterprise Act  (Jordans, Bristol 2003) 
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These attempts at reform have also had a remarkable side-effect. Almost laughably 
they have been used by the UK government as an excuse for delaying reform. 
“Somewhat surprisingly, this distant prospect, which has not yet come to pass, was 
felt to preclude domestic legislative initiatives.”135 The Commission published a draft 
proposal for a directive as early as 1978, apparently unconcerned that the EC Treaty 
expressly states that it “will in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing 
the system of property ownership.”136 This recommended that ROT clauses (including 
the “various complex forms of retention of title”137) should be fully effective 
throughout the EU without any requirement of registration and notification.138 This 
ambitious proposal was swiftly trimmed and a further proposal was published, limited 
to the validity of simple ROT clauses.139 Sadly even this limited proposal for legal 
reform never reached the statute book. 
 
There is a provision concerning ROT in the Late Payment Directive.140 Although this 
Directive started life with reasonably clear substantive aims, “difficult negotiations 
between the Council and European Parliament”141 have meant that the final version 
of Article 4 is a paradigm of obfuscation. Although the article does (ostensibly) 
enable the seller to enforce a simple ROT clause throughout the member states, it goes 
on to say that this validity is dependant on the “applicable national provisions 
designated by private international law.”142 This means that the clause will still be 
governed by national law. Twenty eight years since the first European proposal for 
reform, the only European legislation governing Retention of Title will have 




“The choice of what priority rules to generate is, ultimately, a political one 
because the choice has to be made as to who is most deserving. In Germany the 
banks are seen as least deserving. In Belgium (and France to a lesser extent) the 
opposite view is taken. In England the position is incoherent.”143 
 
This statement goes to the heart of the problem. Over the last 30 years the courts have 
been forced to make a stark choice between two competing claims. On the one hand, 
the contractually agreed rights of parties dealing at arms length; on the other, the 
rights of third party creditors unaware of the ROT clause. The approaches taken in 
two cases, Romalpa and Re Bond Worth, exemplify the impossible task facing the 
courts. Clearly the views expressed by Goff LJ in particular and those of Slade J. are 
poles apart. Although the judgements in both cases are classics of their genre, neither 
                                                          
135 McCormack G. JBL 2002 Mar 113-142 
136 Art.295 TEU 
137 Latham P. Retention of Title. Recent Developments in Europe. JBL (1983) 
138 EC Working Paper III/872/79 Rev. 1 
139 Working Paper III/D/278/80 
140 Directive on combating late payment in commercial transactions 2000/35/EC 
141 Schulte-Braucks & Ongena, European Review of Private Law 4-2003 [519-544] 
142 Late Payment Directive supra. 
143 Monti, Nejman & Reuter supra. 
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stands the test of detailed academic scrutiny. It seems that we are still waiting for a 
convincing judicial analysis either for or against the extended ROT clause.  
 
In the absence of clear legal guidelines, the courts have made their decisions primarily 
on the grounds of policy. The approach has been conservative in the extreme. 
Historically, business has been dependant on the banks for credit to oil the wheels of 
commerce. The clear perception was that ROT clauses threatened to undermine the 
very protections for the banks which the courts had themselves fashioned. With this in 
mind it is possible to comprehend the courts stance more easily.  
 
The rather parochial resistance to outside influence over ROT however, could fairly 
be described as blinkered. Although the United Kingdom has been a full member of 
the EU since 1972, even in Romalpa, a case involving Dutch and English companies, 
no comparative study was undertaken by the court. Roskill LJ came closest by 
casually commenting that it would be interesting to see how such a clause would be 
interpreted in Holland. It is possibly unfair to be overly critical of the courts. Their 
approach has been cautious and can plainly be considered to be unduly favourable to 
the interests of the financial institutions. However this is probably based on perceived 
conceptions that by protecting the banks they are acting for the wider commercial 
good. 
 
The courts do not operate in a vacuum. The judiciary are well aware of the heated 
debate which has surrounded this issue over the last thirty years. The reluctance of the 
government to legislate, despite numerous promptings, can hardly be seen as an 
encouragement to adopt a different line. If there really is “no major constituency 
pressing for change,”144 the courts may well feel that their restrictive approach is 
correct. Similarly, they could claim that the policy of ‘denying Romalpa’ is not 
contrary to the jurisprudence of Strasbourg. The concept of possession within Article 
1 of the First Protocol is ‘autonomous’. It has therefore been held to be fully capable 
of encompassing rights held through an ROT clause. The early indications from the 
only reported case concerning ROT would appear to suggest however, that such 
“interference with the possessions” would be permitted.145 In Gasus-Dosier the court 
gave great weight to the fact that the seller, by dealing in credit, was knowingly taking 
a commercial risk.  
 
The resistance to reform in the UK has not been as well documented as the sustained 
assault made by the American financial institutions on Article 9. The tenor of the 
anonymous submissions to the Law Commission from “the financial institutions” 
however, clearly indicates a high level of hostility to any change in the law. A survey 
of the various Law Commission reports and also a significant number of academic 
articles indicates that there is a further highly influential group opposing change. 
Whilst opinion is clearly divided, a substantial number of legal practitioners are 
strongly resistant to adopting a system similar to Article 9. If such opposition to the 
re-classification of security interests is based on conceptual principles alone it can 
only be regarded as short sighted. This attitude has lead to the extremely uncharitable 
accusation that:  
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“…commercial figures working in the field of secured transactions have 
acquired a specialised body of knowledge and experience and there might be 
something of a fear that simplification and rationalisation of the law could 
threaten the livelihood of those who have learned to master the arcane rules.”146  
 
Whatever the true reason for these objections, it is plain that all creditors, unsecured 
or otherwise, are not interested in legal niceties. They do not engage legal advice to 
ask questions such as: ‘When does title pass, or what constitutes a fiduciary 
relationship?’ Their sole concern is to protect there own interests by salvaging what 
they can from a doomed enterprise. Even in Romalpa itself, the most successful ROT 
claim in English legal history, the plaintiffs still made a loss of £35,000.  
 
Much of the Romalpa case law must be viewed in its historical context. In recent 
years there have been major changes in UK insolvency law. Although attempts to 
reform the law of ROT have been a dismal failure, the position of unsecured creditors 
generally has been slightly improved. Correspondingly, the recent ground breaking 
decision of the House of Lords in Spectrum147 concerning the categorisation of fixed 
and floating charges, has also slightly eroded the banks’ once unassailable position. 
Although the attitude of both judiciary and legislature has been profoundly unhelpful, 
the legacy of Romalpa continues to live on. 
 
The law of ROT does now appear to be settled.  Suppliers can be advised that 
proceeds and manufactured goods clauses will fail. Subject to its incorporation in the 
contract however, a simple clause will usually be effective. Perhaps more surprisingly 
the all monies clause148 has also received high judicial approval. Although the route 
by which this point has been reached defies any meticulous analysis, this modern 
certainty is to be welcomed. ROT remains an invaluable tool for the modern 
businessman, both for its utility as a cheap method of granting credit and as an 
“economic lifeline in times of recession.”149 Despite being denied the full benefits of 
the extended Romalpa clause, ROT devices continue to enable the seller of goods to 
“pull himself up by his own bootstraps”150and assert a modicum of control over his 
commercial destiny. 
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